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Abstract 
Our aim is to assess how the number of working class students entering German universities 
can effectively be increased. Therefore, we estimate the proportion of students from the working 
class that would successfully enter university if certain policy interventions were in place to 
eliminate primary effects (performance differentials between social classes) and/or secondary 
effects (choice differentials net of performance) at different transition points. We extend 
previous research by analysing the sequence of transitions between elementary school 
enrolment and university enrolment and by accounting for the impact that manipulations at 
earlier transitions have on the performance distribution and size of the student ‘risk-set’ at 
subsequent transitions. To this end, we develop a novel simulation procedure which also seeks 
to find viable solutions to the shortcomings in the German data landscape. Our findings show 
that interventions are most effective if they take place early in the educational career. 
Neutralizing secondary effects at the transition to upper secondary school proves to be the 
single most effective means to increase participation rates in tertiary education among working 
class students. However, this comes at the expense of lower average performance levels.  
 
Keywords: Educational inequality, Transition research, Primary and secondary effects, 
Simulation study, Germany, Social stratification. 
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1 Aim and background  
Despite decades of educational expansion, university2 enrolment in Germany is low and 
socially selective (cf. Mayer et al., 2007). This situation is illustrated in Figure 1. It displays the 
distribution of class backgrounds from a German birth cohort that has recently reached the age 
of university enrolment. The figure shows that overall only a small subgroup of the birth cohort 
(26 per cent) enrols in university, well below the OECD average of 38 per cent (OECD, 2010). 
Among this subgroup, students of working class origin are severely underrepresented (with a 
share of only 15 per cent). This suggests that youths from working class families do not or 
cannot, within the educational system, tap their full potential. 
 
Figure 1  Participation rates of a 1985 birth cohort from different class backgrounds at two 
educational stages 
 
Notes: We used father’s class position as an indicator (3 category EGP). In the first column all students born in 
1985 are counted who attended elementary school in 1993. In the second column all students born in 1985 are 
counted who enrolled in university between 2003 and 2008. Class origins are calculated from Microcensus 1993 
at age 8 and from the HIS School Leaver Panel 2004 for first-year university attendance; Total numbers of students 
are calculated from official statistics (German Federal Statistical Office, Fachserien 11.1 and 11.4.1, different 
years). 
 
The obvious solution to these two interrelated problems – low university enrolment in 
combination with high inequality – is to facilitate access to university for students from lower 
class backgrounds. This reasoning motivates the research question of our paper: how can we 
increase the number of university students from working class backgrounds?  
Researchers of social stratification conceive university enrolment as the result of a 
sequence of successive educational transitions between grades or levels of education (Mare, 
1980). At certain transition points in a given educational system, students (and their families) 
typically have to decide between different educational pathways, or they have to decide whether 
                                                
2 We use the term ‘university’ to refer to any type of tertiary education institutions (General Universities, 
Universities of Applied Science, Colleges of Education). 
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to continue schooling or leave. At each transition, social background has an effect on the 
transition behaviour. It is well known that this inequality in school transitions is not reducible 
to differences in academic performance (primary effects). That is to say, even at the same level 
of performance, students from low social origins have a lower propensity of entering the more 
ambitious pathways than their peers from higher social origins (secondary effects, cf. Boudon, 
1974). Primary effects are assumed to depend on differences in socio-cultural resources. In turn, 
secondary effects are the result of differing educational choices. Such choices are seen as the 
outcome of cost-benefit considerations or values that actors attach to certain educational 
alternatives. Note that the above mentioned transition model (Mare, 1980) has important 
implications for the concept of primary and secondary effects if we are interested in not just a 
single transition but the educational life course. It follows from the model, that a selective 
attrition of the population that passes through earlier transitions should lead to an increasingly 
homogenous student body with respect to the distribution of academic abilities at later 
transitions (Mare, 1980: 298-299). Consequently, primary effects of social origin should be of 
reduced importance at the transition to tertiary education. In addition, if students are also 
becoming increasingly homogenous with respect to unobserved characteristics affecting 
transition behaviour, such as educational aspirations, secondary effects should be diminished at 
later transitions as well (Mare, 1980). 
The concept of primary and secondary effects is a useful theoretical framework for our 
research question, even if the underlying mechanisms leading to one or the other are not entirely 
independent (cf. Jackson et al., 2007). In our reading, primary effects can be seen as a result of 
influences prior to a decision point, while secondary effects are the result of active choices at 
a decision point, made within the constraints set by previous performance. As such, the 
distinction structures potential interventions which may charge at different time points. The 
following graph illustrates this: 
 
Figure 2  Temporal model of primary and secondary effects over the educational life-course 
 
 
We argue that knowledge about the relative contribution of primary versus secondary effects 
identifies the scope of inequality which can be reduced by implementing policy measures aimed 
at tackling one or the other effect. With this concept we can identify several critical phases 
during which educational inequality occurs, and during which students from low status 
backgrounds are diverted from entering tertiary education. As we are interested in the most 
effective means to increase the number of working class students at university, we want to 
know: which of these phases is most responsible for diverting the working class offspring from 
entering university? And thus: where are potential interventions most promising?3 
                                                
3 For example: What kind of policy interventions would reduce performance differentials during elementary 
school? Out of the many possibilities, one can think of all day schooling programs or preschool initiatives to 
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In this article, we propose a simulation technique which extends a method developed by 
Erikson et al. (2005). We extend previous research by analysing the sequence of transitions 
between elementary school enrolment and university enrolment and by accounting for the 
impact that manipulations at earlier transitions have on the performance distribution and size 
of the student ‘risk-set’ at subsequent transitions. The basic idea is to follow groups of students 
from different class backgrounds through the educational system and to estimate relative group 
sizes and performance compositions at each educational stage. With this approach we show 
where working class students ‘get lost’ along the way to tertiary education. For the purpose of 
evaluating the scope for policy leverage, we then move beyond the description of factual 
situations to construct counterfactual situations. They can be used to determine what would 
happen to mobility or inequality if different interventions were tried than the policies 
historically observed (Cunha et al., 2006). We simulate the impact of ideal-typical interventions 
which would successfully neutralize primary or secondary effects or both at different points in 
the educational career. That is, we estimate the proportion of students from the working class 
that would successfully enter university if certain policy interventions were in place to eliminate 
primary and/or secondary effects.4 Note that realistic interventions are unlikely to completely 
eliminate primary and/or secondary effects, and hence would have less noticeable effects. 
However, we aim to produce upper-bound estimates of potential interventions, to identify the 
available scope for policy leverage at different phases in the educational life course.  
 
 
2 Institutional background 
Despite some complexities and variation over federal states (cf. KMK, 2010), the ideal-typical 
sequence of the ‘academic route’ in Germany is relatively simple and it is chosen by the vast 
majority of students entering university. Among those, we will simulate how social inequalities 
in entering university would change by manipulating primary and secondary effects at the 
transitions which lie in between.  
The first major branching point comes around the age of 10 when elementary school 
children are selected, according to their demonstrated performance, into one of the different 
secondary school types. About 40 per cent of all students transfer to Gymnasium 
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2010), which is the most demanding track, and the 
only one leading directly to the Abitur. Abitur is the required entrance qualification for tertiary 
education.5 Thus, at an early point in the educational career, most students are largely excluded 
from later enrolment opportunities in tertiary institutions. Initial secondary track allocation is, 
however, not necessarily the final destination, as mobility during secondary school is possible. 
Track mobility can arise from an erratic initial allocation or an unexpected learning 
development. According to Bellenberg et al. (2004: 81) during secondary school about 15 per 
                                                
stimulate and monitor learning among disadvantaged children. Early interventions reducing secondary effects 
could, for example, aim at the provision of information on the long-term benefits of upper secondary education. 
 
4 We assume that vacancies for more university students will be available. Given that policy makers have an 
interest in such a development, and given that the labour market calls for more university graduates, we believe 
this to be a plausible assumption. 
5 In addition, it is possible to obtain eligibility for higher education after phases of vocational training or enrolment 
at institutions of further education, but the Gymnasium is by far the most important route. 
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cent of all students at least once change the school type, most of them to a lower track. Thus, 
unlike the clear cut transition at the end of elementary school, only a minority of students 
experiences a transition during secondary school. 
 
Figure 3  Stylized educational system in Germany 
 
Notes: The figure displays the path from primary education through the general Gymnasium and from there to 
tertiary education. In a stylized form, the major decision points with the corresponding age and grade levels are 
depicted. The numbers in the arrows depict the most recent transition rates (according to Autorengruppe 
Bildungsberichterstattung, 2010 and Heine, Quast, & Beuße, 2010). 
 
After receiving an entrance qualification to tertiary education, students can enrol in traditional 
research universities (Universitäten) or in universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). 
As an alternative to tertiary education, vocational training is frequently chosen by upper 
secondary school graduates (~ 30 per cent), as it is associated with relatively favourable 
employment prospects (Reimer and Pollak, 2010). The availability of this attractive alternative 
to higher education may divert working class children from a tertiary educational career (Becker 
and Hecken, 2009). In combination with the fact that only relatively few students obtain 
eligibility to enrol in university, this may explain the comparatively low share of university 
graduates in Germany.  
 
 
3 Previous research 
While various studies discuss whether the influence of social origin has changed across cohorts, 
only few studies analyse whether it changes across transitions within cohorts. From a 
comparative perspective, Blossfeld and Shavit (1993) conclude, that in 12 out of 13 countries 
the effects tend to be strongest at earlier transitions and then decline for later transitions (see 
also Mare, 1980; Müller and Karle, 1993; Breen and Jonsson, 2000). For Germany, a recent 
study by Hillmert and Jacob (2010) draws a detailed picture of the life-course development of 
educational careers of a 1964 birth cohort by analysing the most relevant types of educational 
transitions associated with the academic track. They provide evidence that students are diverted 
from the academic track at various transition points, including the time span between 
Gymnasium enrolment and completion (i.e. drop-out). While the above mentioned studies 
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highlight the importance of a longitudinal transition perspective for understanding the process 
of educational attainment, they do not incorporate the concept of primary and secondary effects 
in their models. In recent years, however, decomposition methods have been developed to 
assess the relative importance of primary and secondary effects in binary choice models 
(Erikson et al., 2005; Buis, 2010; cf. Karlson and Holm, 2011 for an alternative method). These 
methods have been applied in different countries, but the studies have mostly been restricted to 
one specific transition, typically the first major transition in the respective educational system 
(Erikson and Rudolphi, 2010; Jackson et al., 2007; Kloosterman et al., 2009). For Germany, 
Neugebauer (2010) and Relikowski et al. (2009) estimate that secondary effects account for 43-
59 per cent of class differentials at the transition to Gymnasium. For the transition to university, 
according to Schindler and Reimer (2010), secondary effects are even more pronounced than 
at the first transition, accounting for 75-91 per cent of the differential between salariat class and 
working class offspring. However, such estimates can be misleading, as prior selectivities on 
the way to tertiary eligibility are not considered. To our knowledge the only study which has 
incorporated the empirical distinction of primary and secondary effects over several subsequent 
transitions has been carried out by Becker (2009). Becker simulates the extent to which the 
selective neutralization of either primary or secondary effects at a given educational transition 
would result in an increase of the number of lower background students that would end up in 
higher education. While we find Becker’s conceptual approach appealing, the study bares 
several methodological shortcomings.  
 
 
4 Conceptual approach 
We propose a novel technique based on real data, which improves several methodological 
shortcomings of Becker’s approach. First, we analyse actual transitions instead of mere 
intentions. Second, we recognize the fact that performance is continuous and that transition 
propensities differ at each level of performance – and incorporate it in our simulation strategy. 
Third and most importantly, our simulation takes into account the impact that manipulations at 
earlier transitions have on the performance composition and size of the student group that 
constitutes the risk-set of any following transition. In order to keep the simulation study in 
reasonable dimensions, we chose to compare only two groups: students from working class 
backgrounds with students from salariat backgrounds. We proceed as follows: we start with a 
hypothetical number of 100 students from each group (100 in order to interpret changes in per 
cent). From survey data, we observe the proportion of students in each group making the 
transition to upper secondary school (t1, henceforth) and their respective performance 
distribution before and after the transition. Formally,  
 
 N1g(x) * t1g(x) = N2g(x), (1) 
 
where Nsg(x) denotes the number of students at performance level x for a group g in a given 
situation s (here, s=1 is the end of elementary school and s=2 is the situation right after the 
transition to the Gymnasium) and tsg(x) denotes the transition propensity to the next educational 
level (s+1) for each performance value x. The shape of the performance distribution of any 
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group g in any situation s shall be denoted by Dsg(x). Accordingly, the result of equation (1) 
provides us with information on the size of the group that made the transition to the Gymnasium 
N2g6 and on the shape of this group’s performance distribution D2g(x). In a second step, again 
using survey data, we calculate changes in group size Nsg and performance distribution Dsg(x) 
for the time span between upper secondary school enrolment and completion (t2, henceforth). 
As pointed out before, this is not really a transition but a development over several years. 
Because survival at the Gymnasium is, among other things, caused by performance, the number 
of students (out of the 100 students from each class) as well as their performance distribution 
changes during t2. These events lead to a selective group of students who successfully graduate 
from the Gymnasium. Formally, 
 
 N2g(x) * t2g(x) = N3g(x), (2) 
 
We explain in the data section how we compute t2g(x) in our concrete case in order to obtain 
information on the performance distribution (and the group size) of the subgroup graduating 
from the Gymnasium. At the transition to university (t3, henceforth), we again observe (from 
survey data) class specific transition rates as well as class specific performance distributions 
before and after the transition. Accordingly, we adjust the number of students that make the 
transition. Analogous to the prior transitions, we can write 
 
 N3g(x) * t3g(x) = N4g(x), (3) 
 
Combining formulas (1), (2) and (3), the whole sequence from N1g(x) to N4g(x) can be written 
as: 
 
 N4g(x)= N1g(x) * t1g(x) * t2g(x) * t3g(x)  (4) 
 
With this model we can estimate, at the group level, the performance distribution (and the group 
size) of a group of tertiary education entrants, given information on the performance 
composition at the end of elementary school (N1g(x)), and given their subsequent transition 
functions. Up to this point, our model is based on factual situations. These factual situations 
serve as a standard of comparison for the next step. In order to estimate the importance of 
primary and secondary effects at each transition, we are interested in counterfactual questions, 
such as: what if working class students at t1 retained their own transition propensities but took 
on the level of performance of students of salariat background? Departing from formula (4), 
one is able to conduct counterfactual analyses by replacing the factual components with 
counterfactual (c) ones: 
 
 N4c(x)= N1c(x) * t1c(x) * t2c(x) * t3c(x)  (5) 
 
                                                
6 ( )sg sg
x
N N x , where Nsg(x) is the number of group members in performance category x. 
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Our intention is to simulate ideal-typical worlds in which ‘no primary’ or ‘no secondary’ effects 
exist, in order to show the leeway for potential interventions. To this end, we draw on the model 
of Erikson et al. (2005) to obtain counterfactual components. In this model, it is assumed that 
the choice characteristics of students of one class can be combined with the performance 
distribution of students of another class to produce a counterfactual or potential outcome. The 
importance of primary effects can be estimated by comparing two groups which only differ 
with respect to their performance distributions. Similarly, the importance of secondary effects 
can be estimated by comparing the transition rates of an actual and a counterfactual group, 
which only differ with respect to transition propensities (cf. Jackson et al. 2007 for a more 
comprehensive description of the method).7 Note that the method requires only group level 
information: the performance distribution of each group and the propensity to choose the 
academic route at each level of performance. Returning to our example (‘what if working class 
students at t1 retained their own transition propensities but took on the level of performance of 
students of salariat background?’), we construct a counterfactual group which has the transition 
propensity of the working class group and the performance distribution of the salariat group 
and calculate their transition rate. In comparing this transition rate to the factual transition rate 
of the salariat, we can estimate the importance of secondary effects at t1. Note that in such a 
scenario subsequent transition patterns are counterfactual (unobservable), as the student risk-
set, defined by the number of (‘what-if’ working class) students as well as their performance 
distribution have changed. With our model we can account for these compositional changes and 
adjust the student ‘risk-set’ – in terms of performance distribution Dsg(x) and group size Nsg – 
for the following transitions accordingly. Note that concerning the transition propensity at 
subsequent transitions, we have to make an assumption on how the counterfactual group would 
have behaved had they reached this educational branching point. In different scenarios, we 
assume that subsequent transition propensities resemble either those of the factual working class 
or of the factual salariat class. Then we follow the group until they enter university and end up 
with a hypothetical number of working-class students that would enter university if secondary 
effects at t1 had been neutralized. We can repeat this exercise for a wide range of scenarios, in 
which we simulate the effects that interventions at various stages have on the composition of 
students entering university. We show the most interesting ones in the results section.  
 
5 Data 
As Germany is still lacking proper longitudinal cohort data with information on educational 
trajectories including performance measures, we constructed a quasi-longitudinal cohort 
dataset. A valid and viable solution is to collect data at different points in time; when at each 
time point, the samples are representative of their groups, this approach can effectively track 
changes at the group level (De Vaus, 2001). In our study, three independent samples of students, 
born at the same time, are compared to map the educational career across all three branching 
points. This is not as big a disadvantage as it might seem at first, because our simulation requires 
only group level variables. Three pieces of information are necessary: comparable 
                                                
7 Some implications of the model can be seen problematic. First, secondary effects are treated as residual effects. 
Thus, in as much as the performance variable is prone to measurement error, the contribution of primary effects 
will generally be underestimated. Second, “anticipatory decisions” (cf. Erikson et al. 2005: 9733) are likely to lead 
to underestimation of the secondary effects. The two mechanisms are likely to counteract each other.  
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categorization of social background across all datasets, group specific performance 
distributions prior to the transitions and class specific transition propensities at each level of 
performance. We employ three datasets that correspond to a West German 1971 birth cohort 
and cover their educational career from the end of elementary school to tertiary enrolment (cf. 
Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4  Construction of a quasi-longitudinal 1971 birth cohort study 
 
Notes: a Fauser: Richard Fauser’s ‘transition to secondary school’ – study (ZA No. 1612); b GLHS: German Life 
History Study 1971 (ZA No. 3927); c HIS: Higher Education Information System School Leaver Panel 1990. 
 
For the transition from elementary school to the Gymnasium, we employ data from the Fauser-
study (Fauser, 1984). The sampling frame consists of families from four different federal states 
in Germany who had children in the last year of elementary school in the school year 1982/83. 
The first of two waves was carried out in 1982/83, when children attended the last year of 
elementary school. The second wave was administered in 1984, after the children had 
transferred to a secondary school track. We construct a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether or not a student transferred to the Gymnasium. After listwise deletion, the analytical 
sample consists of 2620 cases.  
For the sequence from entering Gymnasium to graduating from it (i.e. obtaining Abitur), 
we draw on data from the 1971 birth cohort in the German Life History Study (GLHS) (Hillmert 
and Mayer, 2004), which contains detailed retrospective life course information. We limit our 
analysis to respondents who went through the West German educational system. To obtain net 
survival rates at the Gymnasium, we calculate how many students with a given social 
background enter Gymnasium at the beginning (N2g) and how many students with that social 
background graduate from it (N3g).8 After listwise deletion, we end up with an analytical sample 
of 1209 cases. 
For the transition to tertiary education we draw on the Higher Education Information 
System (HIS) School Leaver Panel 1990. Graduates were interviewed half a year (wave 1) and 
three and a half years (wave 2) after graduation. In order to observe actual postsecondary 
schooling decisions rather than intentions, we use information from the second wave. We 
construct a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a student, within 3 ½ years after 
                                                
8 We count only those students who have obtained their degree at a Gymnasium before reaching the age of 21. 
Because there is the possibility of grade repetition (staying down a year) and in a few cases late elementary school 
enrolment, we choose age 21 instead of 18/19. 
1971 year 1977 1983 1990
birthevent 
entry  
elem. school  t1 t3
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graduation, enrolled in a higher education institution. To increase comparability over datasets, 
we restrict our analysis to students born in 1970/71, who obtained their degree via the 
conventional academic route and who come from the four federal states that constitute the 
sampling frame of the Fauser data. After listwise deletion we end up with an analytical sample 
of 5805 cases. In all analyses we apply sample weights provided by the data producers, which 
account for selective non-response and panel attrition. 
While our strategy of relying on three different data sources might be seen as 
problematic, we have done anything to maximize comparability across the datasets. In addition, 
we conducted several sensitivity checks with other datasets and other sample compositions.9 
The results were essentially the same. Thus, although not perfect, we believe to have found a 
reasonable solution to the lack of real cohort data when analyzing educational careers in 
Germany. 
Social origin. We take class of father as our indicator of students’ class background and 
rely on mother’s class in case father’s information is missing. We work with a threefold collapse 
of the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema: salariat or service class (Classes I and II), intermediate 
classes (Classes III and IV) and working class (Classes V, VI and VII). 
Academic performance. At the transition to Gymnasium and the transition to tertiary 
education, we capture primary effects through grade point averages (gpa), as this measure is 
comparable across transitions. As there is no ability testing, grades are the most sensible 
measure for primary effects in Germany (cf. Stocké, 2007). At the first transition, we employ 
the average of the two most important grades (German and Mathematics) that appeared in the 
final elementary school report card. At the transition to tertiary education, we use the grade 
point average obtained in the graduation certificate (‘Abitur’). The German grading system runs 
from 1 to 6: 1 (excellent), 2 (good), 3 (satisfactory), 4 (sufficient), 5 (poor), 6 (insufficient). We 
do not have performance information (in the GLHS) for the period from Gymnasium enrolment 
to graduation. Therefore, it is not possible to apply the concept of primary and secondary effects 
for this sequence properly. However, since we have information on the shape of the 
performance distribution D2g(x) of Gymnasium entrants from the Fauser data and on the shape 
of the performance distribution D3g(x) of Gymnasium graduates from the HIS data, we are able 
to generate a transformation factor which translates the former distributional shape into the 
latter for each group: t2g(x) = D3g(x)/D2g(x). 10  If the temporal shifts of the performance 
distributions are different for social background groups, this would indicate a differential group 
specific performance development at the Gymnasium and be an approximation to the concept 
of primary effects. However, the performance distribution of the Gymnasium graduates is not 
only the result of their performance development since enrolment; it is also influenced by drop-
out from Gymnasium. It is plausible to assume that Gymnasium drop-outs are to some extent 
the result of secondary effects, i.e. students from underprivileged backgrounds drop out more 
often than students from privileged backgrounds even if performance is held constant. 
Accordingly, the performance development deducted from the comparison of the grade 
                                                
9 Other datasets were, for t3, more recent HIS Panels, and for t1 the DJI Kinderpanel 2003/2004 as well as PIRLS 
2001 data. For several reasons (among them, the impossibility to construct a quasi-longitudinal cohort) we opted 
for the presented data bases. 
10 This is possible because grades are measured on the same scale in both datasets. Figure A1 in the appendix 
shows a graphical representation of the weighting factors for the transformation of performance distributions, by 
social background. 
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distributions does not only reflect primary effects of the Gymnasium sequence but is also 
influenced by secondary effects. As mentioned above, we calculate class-specific net survival 
rates from the Gymnasium to account for these shifts. Table 1 depicts summary information on 
educational sequences for each social background group. It shows, separately for each 
transition, observed transition/survival rates. It also describes mean grade point averages (mean 
gpa) for the respective population at risk to select ‘Gymnasium’ and tertiary education, as well 
as for the subgroups actually selecting these options. In the following analysis we will piece 
together the single transitions and observe the educational life course up to university 
enrolment. 
 
Table 1 Transition rates into ‘Gymnasium’ (t1), net survival rates from ‘Gymnasium’ 
enrolment to completion (t2), transition rates into university (t3), and corresponding 
mean grade point averages for students from different class backgrounds. 
  t1  t2  t3  
Social Origin mean 
gpa of 
entire 
sample  
transition 
rate 
mean gpa of 
subgroup 
continuing to 
‘Gymnasium’ 
net 
survival 
rate 
mean 
gpa of 
entire  
sample 
transition  
rate 
mean gpa of 
subgroup 
continuing to 
university  
Salariat 2.16 74 % 1.96 93 % 2.35 82 % 2.27 
Intermediate 2.32 56 % 2.00 89 % 2.50 69 % 2.38 
Working 2.59 27 % 2.05 82 % 2.59 62 % 2.48 
Odds Ratios 
S/W  7.84  2.68  2.76  
S/I  2.31  1.64  1.97  
I/W  3.39  1.63  1.40  
Notes: Odds calculations based on non-rounded transition rates. t1: Fauser (n=2620); t2: GLHS (n=1209); t3 : HIS 
(n=5805); own calculations. 
 
 
6 Results 
6.1. The factual educational life course perspective 
To begin with, we display in the first panel of Table 2 the factual situation for students from 
salariat families (row 1) and students from working class families (row 2). The table ought to 
be read from left to right, following each group’s educational life course. We do not show the 
intermediate class for the sake of brevity. In each class, we have fixed the group sizes to a 
hypothetical number of 100 students (column 1). This allows for a per cent interpretation for 
the subsequent educational stages. As we already know from Table 1, students from the salariat 
class fare better in elementary school than their classmates from the working class (mean gpa 
of 2.16 vs. 2.59, cf. col. 2). In the next columns, we denote the group from which we draw the 
performance distribution (col. 3) and the transition function (col. 4). ‘s’ stands for students from 
salariat backgrounds, ‘w’ for students from working class backgrounds and ‘c’ denotes 
counterfactual situations. As can be seen in column 5, 74 salariat class students and only 27 
working class students make the transition to the Gymnasium. However, the selection processes 
at this first transition cause the performance distributions of Gymnasium entrants to be quite 
 12
similar for both groups (col. 6). Next, we look at the period between Gymnasium enrolment 
and graduation (t2). The group with salariat origin has a net survival rate of 93 per cent, while 
among the group of students with working class origin only 82 per cent ‘survive’ and 
successfully graduate from Gymnasium. Accounting for the net survival leads to 69 (74 * 93 
per cent) salariat class students and 22 (27 * 82 per cent) working class students who 
successfully graduate from Gymnasium (col. 9). Note that the performance distributions for 
each class at graduation are not identical to the ones at enrolment. We observe two processes 
here: the overall grade distribution is widening11, and the difference between classes is 
widening. Students from salariat backgrounds manage to be more successful in improving their 
performance throughout secondary education relative to students from working class families. 
In other words, their average performance development at the Gymnasium seems to be more 
favourable. This is captured by the class specific transformation functions t2g(x) as described 
above. The 69 Gymnasium graduates from salariat backgrounds have a mean gpa of 2.35 and 
the 22 graduates from working class backgrounds have a mean gpa of only 2.59 (col. 10). Out 
of the 69 salariat class students 56 make the transition to university. Out of the 22 working class 
students, only 14 enter university (col. 13). As an indicator of social inequalities in tertiary 
education participation, column 15 denotes the odds ratios of ending up in tertiary education 
between the salariat class reference group (row 1) and each of the subsequent factual and 
counterfactual working class rates. In the factual contrast, salariat class students are 7.82 times 
more likely than working class students to reach tertiary education when following the standard 
route through the Gymnasium (row 2). Despite selection on performance up to this point, the 
performance distribution among university entrants is still somewhat more favourable for 
students from salariat backgrounds (col. 14).  
 
6.2. Counterfactual scenarios 
In the following, we manipulate the progress through the education system for the group from 
working class families by replacing its performance distributions and/or transition functions 
with the respective values of the other group. Thus, we simulate the impact of ideal-typical 
policy interventions directed at neutralizing either primary or secondary effects or both at one 
or more transitions on the number of working class students entering universities. In this joint 
consideration there are six variables that can be altered: the performance distribution at the end 
of elementary school, the transition function from elementary school to the Gymnasium, the 
performance development at the Gymnasium, the net survival rate at the Gymnasium, the 
performance distribution of Gymnasium graduates, and the transition function from 
Gymnasium graduation to higher education. Out of the many counterfactual situations that can 
be constructed that way, we present the most interesting ones in panel 2 of Table 2.12 
Manipulated variables are indicated by a shaded area. 
 
  
                                                
11 The average grades of Gymnasium entrants are necessarily better than the average grades of Gymnasium 
graduates, since the former are a selection of the top performers in elementary school, while the latter again 
receive grades drawn from the entire grading scale. 
12 The simulation tool and our aggregate data can be accessed at www.mzes.uni-
mannheim.de/publications/misc/simulation.xls, where it is possible to try out the various combinations of factual 
and counterfactual scenarios. 
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Table 2  Factual (panel 1) and counterfactual (panel 2) movements through the German education system 
 Elementary 
school 
Transition t1 to  
Gymnasium 
Gymnasium 
(enrolment) 
Gymnasium 
(t2) 
Gymnasium 
(graduation) 
Transition t3 to 
Tertiary 
Education 
Tertiary 
Education 
(enrolment) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 no. of 
students
mean 
gpa 
perform. 
distr. 
transition 
function
no. of 
students
mean gpa perform. 
developm.
net 
survival 
rate 
no. of 
students
mean gpa perform. 
distr. 
transition 
function
no. of 
students
mean gpa odds ratio 
S/W 
(1) 100 2.16 D1s(x) t1s(x) 74 1.96 t2s(x) 93 % 69 2.35 D3s(x) t3s(x) 56 2.27 1.00 
(2) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2w(x) 82 % 22 2.59 D3w(x) t3w(x) 14 2.48 7.82 
 
(3) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2w(x) 82 % 22 2.59 D3w(x) t3s(x) 17 2.51 6.21 
(4) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2c(x) 82 % 22 2.35 D3s(x) t3w(x) 14 2.24 7.82 
(5) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2c(x) 82 % 22 2.35 D3s(x) t3s(x) 18 2.27 5.80 
(6) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2w(x) 93 % 25 2.59 D3w(x) t3w(x) 15 2.48 7.21 
(7) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2s(x) 82 % 22 2.46 D3c(x) t3w(x) 14 2.35 7.82 
(8) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1w(x) 27 2.04 t2s(x) 93 % 25 2.46 D3c(x) t3w(x) 16 2.35 6.68 
(9) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1s(x) 59 2.25 t2w(x) 82 % 48 2.83 D3c(x) t3w(x) 28 2.74 3.27 
(10) 100 2.16 D1s(x) t1w(x) 42 1.78 t2w(x) 82 % 34 2.18 D3c(x) t3w(x) 23 2.08 4.26 
(11) 100 2.16 D1s(x) t1s(x) 74 1.96 t2w(x) 82 % 61 2.50 D3c(x) t3w(x) 38 2.39 2.08 
(12) 100 2.59 D1w(x) t1s(x) 59 2.25 t2w(x) 93 % 55 2.83 D3c(x) t3s(x) 41 2.76 1.83 
(13) 100 2.16 D1s(x) t1w(x) 42 1.78 t2c(x) 82 % 34 2.35 D3s(x) t3w(x) 22 2.24 4.51 
(14) 100 2.16 D1s(x) t1w(x) 42 1.78 t2s(x) 82 % 34 2.03 D3c(x) t3w(x) 24 1.93 4.03 
(15) 100 2.16 D1s(x) t1w(x) 42 1.78 t2s(x) 93 % 39 2.03 D3c(x) t3w(x) 27 1.93 3.44 
Notes: The shape of the performance distribution of any group g in any situation s is denoted by Dsg(x) and tsg(x) denotes the transition propensity to the next educational level for 
each performance value x. s=salariat, w=working, c=counterfactual. Manipulated variables are indicated by a shaded area.. Sources: t1: Fauser (n=2620), t2: GLHS (n=1209), t3: 
HIS (n=5805), own calculations.  If we employ the standard decomposition approach (cf. Erikson et al. 2005), this would result in 66 percent secondary effects at t1 and 88 
percent secondary effects at t3.  
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6.2.1 Manipulating the transition to university 
We start with manipulating the transition from upper secondary to tertiary education (rows 3-
5). We neutralize secondary effects at t3 to evaluate how many working class students would 
enter universities if their propensity to choose university education would equal that of their 
peers of salariat background. As can be seen in row 3, we gain 3 additional students compared 
to the factual situation. However, as students with lower performance now have a higher 
propensity of entering university, this comes at the expense of a somewhat lower (2.51 vs. 2.48) 
and more heterogeneous performance distribution,. We neutralize primary effects at t3 to find 
out how many working class students would enter universities if their performance distribution 
at the end of upper secondary school would equal the distribution of their peers of salariat 
background. It may seem surprising that a neutralization of primary effects at t3 does not 
increase the number of working class students who enter universities. But because performance 
is not of great importance at t3 and because the distributions do not differ much between classes 
(cf. Table 1), a neutralization of primary effects at this stage has no impact.13 Overall, 
interventions at t3 result in rather modest increases in the number of working class students. 
Even neutralizing both primary and secondary effects at this transition only elevates the number 
of students to 18 instead of 14. In other words: 18 per cent of all working class students would 
enter tertiary education in this scenario. Note that neutralizations of primary effects at t3 
automatically imply a counterfactual performance development up to this point (cf. column 7, 
rows 4 and 5). Performance distributions cannot just be changed by punctual interventions. If 
performance distributions at t3 should be identical for both groups, working class students 
would have to catch up in elementary school or between Gymnasium entrance and graduation.  
 
6.2.2 Manipulating the sequence at the Gymnasium 
Rows 6-8 display manipulations of the sequence at the Gymnasium. At first sight, neutralizing 
survival differentials (row 6) seems somewhat more effective for achieving higher tertiary 
enrolment rates (col. 13) and neutralizing performance development differentials (row 7) seems 
somewhat more effective for lifting performance levels in higher education (col. 14), but again 
effects are comparably small. To answer how many working class students would enter 
universities if their net survival rate and performance development during upper secondary 
school would equal that of students of salariat background we consider performance 
development and drop-out rates in combination (row 8). This results in a gain of 2 additional 
working class students at university with a performance level that is in between the two factual 
groups.14  
 
6.2.3 Manipulating the transition to the Gymnasium 
Rows 9-11 are devoted to the manipulation of the transition from elementary school to the 
Gymnasium. The guiding research question is how many working class students would enter 
universities if their propensity to choose Gymnasium would equal that of their peers of salariat 
                                                
13 Since we display rounded numbers we hide the fact that there is a small impact, which is visible only in the 
decimals of the predicted number of students. 
14 Similar to the argument above, performance shifts at earlier stages imply performance shifts at later stages, 
which is why counterfactual (c) performance distributions emerge in rows 7 and 8, column 11. 
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background (row 9)? Neutralizing secondary effects at t1 would increase the tertiary 
participation rate of working class students substantially. Leaving all subsequent transition 
functions unaltered, it would result in 59 instead of 27 Gymnasium entrants, 48 instead of 22 
Gymnasium graduates, and in 28 instead of 14 tertiary education students. However, these 
increased participation rates come at the expense of decreasing the mean performance levels at 
all stages (columns 6, 10 and 14). This phenomenon occurs because working-class students, 
who have a comparably low performance distribution, now have the same propensity as 
students of salariat origin to enter the Gymnasium. Thus, their counterfactual performance 
distribution at the Gymnasium and at subsequent stages is considerably worse. How many 
working class students would enter universities if their performance distribution at the end of 
elementary school would equal the distribution of their peers of salariat background (row 10)? 
Neutralizing primary effects would increase the number of university entrants (23) but to a 
lower extent as compared to neutralizing secondary effects. This scenario highlights again how 
early interventions affect the following transitions. Students of this counterfactual group have 
a more restrictive transition propensity at each point of the performance scale than students of 
salariat background, while they are equally well performing at elementary school level. This 
leads to a situation where these students at later stages would possess a more favourable 
performance distribution compared to students of salariat backgrounds (mean gpa of 2.08 vs. 
2.27 in col. 14). Neutralizing both primary and secondary effects at the first transition would 
increase the participation rate in higher education drastically (38 instead of 14 students) and 
raise the performance distributions after each transition slightly if compared to the factual 
situation of working class students. 
In summary, if we compare the potential impact of single interventions at each of the 
critical phases during which educational inequality occurs, one can state that interventions 
during elementary school or at the transition to secondary school are most promising for raising 
the number of students that end up in higher education. Note however, that a unilateral 
neutralization of secondary effects results in lower average performance levels of working class 
students entering universities.  
 
6.2.4 Manipulating several phases simultaneously 
So far, our scenarios accounted for the effects of early interventions on the student risk-set and 
their performance distribution at subsequent stages. They did, however, not acknowledge that 
early interventions are likely to also have lagged effects on subsequent transition propensities. 
If interventions could be introduced which are capable of reducing, say, secondary effects at t1, 
(e.g. through increasing aspirations), they are likely to have an impact also on secondary effects 
at t2 and t3. In the following scenarios, we take this possibility into account. In row 12 secondary 
effects are neutralized at each of the three transitions. Such a scenario reflects the possibility of 
lagged effects of an early intervention on later transition propensities, or the effect of joint 
interventions aimed at neutralizing secondary effects which are simultaneously introduced at 
t1, t2, and t3. Technically, we exchange the transition propensities not at one but at all three 
transitions to simulate such a scenario (cf. formula 5 above). In such a scenario, the number of 
higher education students from working class families would increase to 41. However, among 
them would be relatively more poor performing students (the mean gpa would be 2.76 instead 
of 2.48). Another scenario is simulated in rows 13 and 14. Here, the performance distributions 
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at all levels are replaced by the performance distributions of students of salariat background, 
i.e. primary effects are neutralized at all stages. Because of the developmental character of 
primary effects, we have two options here. We can either neutralize primary effects at t1 and t3, 
which would imply a counterfactual performance development at t2. Or we could neutralize 
primary effects at t1 and t2, which results in a counterfactual performance distribution at t3. In 
both scenarios, roughly the same number of students would enter university (22 or 24). Note 
however, that the performance distribution of the students in university is more favourable, if 
we let it be the result of all previous manipulations (row 14) instead of imposing the distribution 
of the reference group (row 13). One might object that neutralizing primary effects at t1 should 
also impact the Gymnasium survival rates of working class students. Row 15 repeats the 
scenario from row 14, but with imposing the salariat survival rates in column 8. This can be 
considered as an upper bound of joint interventions in primary effects in the potential to raise 
higher education rates of working class students. Note however, that the number of 27 working 
class students making their way to higher education (col. 13) under this scenario is still 
comparatively modest in relation to the situation where all secondary effects are eliminated 
(row 12). On the other hand, tertiary education performance levels are clearly superior 
compared to the scenario in which secondary effects at all levels are neutralized (1.93 vs. 2.76). 
Implications will be discussed in the concluding section. 
 
 
7 Discussion 
Despite decades of educational expansion, low university graduation rates in combination with 
high inequality have remained to be of great concern to mobility researchers and policy makers 
alike. In this paper we assessed where the many students from working class families get lost 
along the educational path leading to university enrolment. Furthermore, we estimated the scope 
for interventions at the different critical phases during which inequality occurs. To this end, we 
set up a simulation framework, in which we evaluated the potential of different ideal-typical 
interventions. Within the framework of primary and secondary effects, we simulated 
interventions aimed at reducing either primary or secondary effects or both at various time 
points along the way to university enrolment. We found that neutralizing primary or secondary 
effects just before or at the transition to university has a negligible effect on enrolment rates. 
This may come as a surprise to many practitioners, who, for example, hope to increase working 
class participation rates at university by increasing financial aid. In the light of our findings, 
one has to conclude that such interventions may come too late. Likewise, interventions during 
secondary school probably have only modest influences on working class participation rates at 
university. The main message that emerged from our exercises is: interventions are most 
effective if they tackle inequalities early in the educational career. This is not to say that later 
initiatives are misguided. However, interventions aimed at reducing performance differentials 
during elementary school offer a substantially larger scope to increase the share of working 
class students entering universities. We estimated a potential gain of 9 percentage points (from 
14 to 23) for these types of interventions. Even more so, interventions aimed at reducing choice 
differentials at the transition to secondary school can potentially raise the share up to 28 per 
cent (a gain of 14 percentage points). Note however, that interventions have to find a balance 
between the reduction of primary and secondary effects. We were able to show that a unilateral 
 17
neutralization of secondary effects can be very effective in increasing participation numbers at 
various educational stages, but this would come at the expense of a lower average performance 
distribution of working class students. In such a scenario, Gymnasiums and universities would 
either have to lower the standard of teaching, or drop-out rates are likely to increase among 
working-class students. Thus, a more negative performance distribution may offset the positive 
impact of elevated participation numbers. Leaving students with the negative shock of a drop-
out experience may be even worse for self-esteem and future job motivation than not having 
them enter the ‘academic route’ at all. In consequence, a combined effort to neutralize both 
primary and secondary effects at early stages of the education system promises the most 
efficient outcomes with respect to increasing participation numbers in higher education and 
their performance levels. In this respect, our findings are in line with James Heckman who 
maintains that “early interventions targeted toward disadvantaged children have much higher 
returns than later interventions” but that if maximum value is to be realized “early investments 
must be followed by later investments” (Heckman, 2006: 1902). Besides potential negative 
effects for the standard of teaching, or for the survival rates of working class students at the 
Gymnasium, other unintended consequences may evolve by reducing secondary effects. The 
theory of effectively maintained inequality (Lucas, 2001) posits that actors from more 
privileged social backgrounds secure for themselves advantages wherever possible. If the 
educational system diminishes as a means of social stratification, it is likely that these actors 
pursue other means for reproducing their relative advantage. For example, they may strive for 
more qualitative advantages within the educational system (e.g. private schools), or they may 
rely on other signals or resources (e.g. social contacts, social skills, informal education) to 
secure intergenerational status maintenance.  
Some limitations of our study should be mentioned. First, since the simulation procedure 
is based on the technique by Erikson and colleagues, it is of course subject to all critique which 
is directed to their method (cf. footnote 7). Second, we simulate only scenarios in which there 
are no primary or no secondary effects. The reason is that we aim to produce upper-bound 
estimates of potential interventions, in order to identify the available scope for policy leverage 
at different phases in the educational life course. As mentioned above, realistic interventions 
are unlikely to completely eliminate primary and/or secondary effects, and hence would have 
less noticeable effects. Third, while we are able to simulate how early interventions would 
change the subsequent group size and performance composition of (what-if) working class 
students, we have no knowledge on the transition behavior of a group in such a counterfactual 
scenario. Thus, we have to make assumptions on how such a group would have behaved had 
they reached a certain educational branching point. In different scenarios, we assumed that 
subsequent transition functions resemble either those of the factual working class or of the 
factual salariat class. It might very well be the case, that this overestimates the realistic transition 
propensity of counterfactual groups. In that sense, our results display, again, upper-bound 
estimates. Fourth, we assume a simplified binary choice structure of educational decisions along 
the way to university enrolment. As this simplified path is taken by the majority of university 
students, we argue that our model, in a parsimonious way, summarizes the general pattern of 
class differences. However, it does this at the expense of losing information about potentially 
significant variation within the system (Breen and Jonsson, 2000). For example, the 
differentiation of pathways to obtain eligibility to study at the tertiary level might be a way of 
reducing inequality, and policy makers are interested in the effects of this expansion. Fifth, 
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terminating the simulation study with enrolment to higher education might be considered as a 
cutting point which is one transition too early. We would have liked to include graduation from 
tertiary education as well, but adequate data sources were not available. As soon as data is 
available that covers the period from higher education enrolment to graduation, this sequence 
can easily be incorporated. Our paper was devoted to the German situation and proposed 
solutions on how to gather information from different data sources in order to construct a quasi-
longitudinal cohort which is progressing from elementary to tertiary education. Of course, the 
consideration of the cumulative impact of primary and secondary effects can be accomplished 
with real cohort data as well – with much less effort. We would be happy to encourage 
replications of our simulation exercise with different data and for different countries.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1 Graphical representation of weighting factors between Gymnasium entrants’ 
performance distribution and Gymnasium graduates’ performance distribution, by 
class 
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